good" to replace the "politics of rights" and "competing interests". 7 A politics of rights, they say, has created "atomistic" individuals who have no stake in participating in the life of their political community. 8 These sentiments are anticipated by the 20 th Century southern conservative intellectual, Richard Weaver, who deplores "the anonymity and the social indifference of urban man" held together only by "the cash nexus," and who writes feelingly of "the rooted culture" of the South, in which each person "working in his sphere went to make up a whole" with "a common bond of feeling." absence from the economic and political life of commercial societies or, at least, in permanent danger from the "marketing orientation" encouraged by such societies.
1.2
How far is this picture true of life in commercial societies in general and America in particular, where the ideology of individual rights and free markets is probably stronger than anywhere else? Judging from some well-known facts of American life and the spate of articles and books on the sorry state of American society, the picture seems depressingly accurate. Libertarians, left-liberal, communitarian, and conservative critics may all point with dismay at the phenomenon of business interests lobbying local, state, and federal governments for special favors in the form of subsidies or protections, or outright appropriation of others' property, even as they cloak their demands in the rhetoric of protecting free markets and the right to economic opportunity.
Communitarians and others may give as an example of a politics of competing interests the litigiousness of American society, with legions of trial lawyers enriching themselves by nobly defending the "right" of their helpless and hapless clients to be protected from the evil blandishments of fattening foods. 11 Some liberals, such as Anderson and Radin (and, no doubt, many conservatives and communitarians) deplore the relatively new phenomenon of contract pregnancy or surrogate motherhood for improperly 11 And even, sometimes, from the imaginary harms done by various products. For example, as R. Samuelson reports in "Asbestos Fraud" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ articles/A12624-2002Nov19.html), although asbestos use has gone down precipitously, asbestos law suits have risen dramatically, as trial lawyers take advantage of permissive tort laws to bring class law suits on behalf of individuals who have suffered no harm, and at the expense of businesses, their shareholders, and truly sick patients. Lawyers go hunting for "victims" to represent with ads like: "Find out if YOU have MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS." Needless to say, none of this is meant to suggest that there are no justified asbestos law suits.
commodifying female reproductive labor or children. 12 If contract pregnancy were to be widely accepted, Anderson argues, it "would change the way people (parents and brokers) value children generally -from being worthy of love by their parents and respect by others, to being sometimes the alienated objects of commercial profit-making" (172). Radin also argues that widespread commodification of surrogate motherhood might have a rhetorical "domino effect" that leads people to think of women's attributes, especially their reproductive capacities, and of children, as commodities (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) .
Similarly, commodified sex (prostitution) debases a gift value (Anderson, 154), not only for those who buy and sell sex, but also for others, because it both stems from and encourages a debased attitude towards women's sexuality in the personal sphere (154).
"The same masculine sexual desire," states Anderson, "is gratified in personal and commodified sexual relations" (155).
Again, Schwarzenbach presents the "disintegration of traditional (Bourgeois) familial relations, and staggering rates of systemic homelessness, drug dependency, illiteracy, and so forth" (99) as evidence of a breakdown of civic and personal friendship.
She claims that the emphasis on liberty rights and production is partly responsible for the damage to friendship, and that the damage can be undone only by moving away from liberty rights and production (115-116 Putnam also acknowledges the force of the argument made by many observers that, to the extent that social capital has been destroyed, it might be due to "crowding out" of private initiative by "big government and the growth of the welfare state," but does not address the argument in any detail. activities like voting and working for political parties, or membership in labor unions, as social capital. But a decline in political partisan activity might be argued to represent a growth in wisdom about the nature of the two main parties, and a decline in union membership surely reflects, among other things, the dynamic nature of the American workplace and the fact that American workers are now better off than workers in almost any country. Some of these critics apotheosize pre-commercial societies or herald the brave new world of the post-capitalist future, others simply want to make market societies safe for "the higher things" in life. But all agree that the orientation or mode of valuation proper to market transactions is hostile to the mode of valuation proper to personal and civic friendship, so that wherever you have the first, you have a weakening, or even demise, of the second. An adequate response to these critics requires analyzing this thesis of the psychology of market relations. Anderson offers the most developed argument for this thesis, so I will start with a description of her argument.
II. Market Norms and the Norms of Friendship

2.1
The modes of valuation proper to market production and market relations,
Anderson argues, are radically opposed to the modes of valuation proper to friendship, love, sexuality, and so on. We value pure commodities and market relations only insofar as they are useful as means to our independently defined ends, whereas we value the latter as ends in themselves (144-45). But use "is a lower, impersonal, and exclusive mode of valuation" that sees things as fungible and capable of being "traded with equanimity for any other commodity at some price" (144). This stands in contrast to respect, appreciation, or love, which are modes of valuation for entities and relationships that are seen as having intrinsic, irreplaceable value. Similarly, Schwarzenbach argues that instrumental productive activity (poiesis) is a lower form of activity than the noninstrumental activity (praxis) of love and care (epimeleia). It is, again, because of the instrumentality and fungibility ("market-alienability") of commodities that Radin fears that permitting universal commodification, with its market rhetoric and market methodology, would lead us to think even of personal relationships and attributes of personhood as commodities. All three writers conclude that we should limit economic liberties through prohibition or regulation of certain markets as a way of expressing the intrinsic value we place on persons and personal or civic relationships and preventing market norms from spreading.
23
Since goods and relations can be commodified to different degrees, it is useful to start with what Anderson calls pure economic goods and relations. A pure economic good, says Anderson, is a good whose "production, distribution, and enjoyment are properly governed" by market norms and whose value "can be fully realized through use"
(143). A pure economic good is a pure commodity, properly valued as a mere means to "independently defined ends" (144). The market norms that "exclusively" govern its production, distribution, and enjoyment have "five features that express the attitudes surrounding use and embody the economic ideal of freedom: they are impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and oriented to 'exit' rather than 'voice'" (145-6).
Schwarzenbach echoes some of the same claims. The "proper concern" of production, she says, is "with its product (and only indirectly with human relations or needs); [and] its incentive is usually exclusive, private ownership or benefit to the self" (105). Thus, economic rights like the right to private property and the right to contract promote "selfish" behavior, in contrast to welfare rights, which promote the nurturing, "reproductive" activities of civic friendship (115-16).
These claims about the nature of commodities and market relations may be illustrated by the following imaginary everyday market transaction. When I give $2 to the 23 The intrinsic values they want protected range from motherhood and sexuality (Anderson and Radin) and civic friendship (Schwarzenbach) to labor and housing (Radin). Anderson also objects to governments treating public health and safety and the environment as mere commodities (Ch. 9).
street vendor in exchange for a hot dog, I am justified in seeing and valuing the transaction and my $2 simply as a means to my gustatory satisfaction. My relationship to the vendor is impersonal, in that we have no knowledge of, or concern for, each other's social status or character. The relationship also seems to be purely egoistic, insofar as both the street vendor and I seem to be concerned only with our own independently defined interests, with no regard for each other's interests (except as means to our own interests). For all these reasons, the goods exchanged (the money and the hot dog) as well as my relationship to the vendor are entirely fungible: any vendor on the street who made a good hot dog would have done equally well, as would any hot dog from his cart in exchange for any two dollar bills from my wallet. Our relationship is also exclusive, want-regarding, and oriented to exit rather than voice. The vendor and I have exclusive rights to the goods exchanged, which are distinct and not shared, we both respond to each other's wants without asking if these wants are worthy (he doesn't quiz me about the nutritional value of my daily diet, and I don't quiz him about the worth of his occupation), and we both know that, as market actors, we can influence each other's behavior chiefly through trade or a refusal to trade -a simple "take it or leave it" (exit).
In should be easy to see the differences between my relationship to the vendor and a close friendship. Both involve an exchange of goods, but in friendship these goods, as
Anderson puts it, are "jointly realized," and are "not merely used but cherished and appreciated, for they are expressions of shared understandings, affections, and commitments" (151). Further, they can be exchanged only as gifts, and they aim "to realize a shared good in the relationship itself, whereas market exchange aims to realize distinct goods for each party." Presumably Anderson does not mean that no good in a friendship is distinct or separately realized, but that the goods central to friendship, such as trust, affection, sympathy, and companionship, are shared and jointly realized. What makes something a shared good is not only that it is enjoyed with others, but that it is enjoyed "according to shared understandings of what it means" (144). Moreover, even though both gift and market exchange require reciprocity, the form and timing differ. In friendship we expect reciprocity "only in the long term," for "gifts are given for the friend's sake, not merely for the sake of obtaining some good for oneself in return" (151-52). Schwarzenbach also stresses that the "proper goal" of reproductive praxis "in the best case" is not "exclusive private ownership but a shared appropriation of the human world" and "unselfish satisfaction" (103).
The psychology of friendships, then, seems radically different from the psychology of market relationships. Hence, one can understand the alarm of those who think that, if market rhetoric and market norms were to spread into all areas of life, they would replace (as both Marx and Thomas Carlyle complained) the "human nexus" with the "cash nexus". Before we join in the alarm, however, we need to ask the following questions.
2.2
Is the kind of relationship with the hot dog vendor I used above to illustrate market norms paradigmatic of market relations, or are there many kinds of market relations? Even if the vendor relationship is paradigmatic of market relations, is it a purely commodified relationship -that is, governed only by the market norms just described -or is it also essentially governed by certain norms it shares with noncommodified relationships, including certain forms of friendship? To be sure, if a market relationship concerning the production or exchange of a pure commodity is defined as a purely commodified relationship, then the answer must be that the vendor relationship is purely commodified and that it shares no norms with friendship. But this answer, as I argue below, cannot be right; for although there are pure commodities and purely commodified relationships (such as the slave-master's to the slave or the hostage-taker's to the hostage), there can be no purely commodified market relationships. 24 Again, even if economic activities concerning the production or exchange of pure commodities can be properly valued entirely instrumentally, can they not also be properly valued also as ends? And finally, even if the value of some economic activities is entirely instrumental, are they necessarily inferior to "friendship activities," or is this an unwarranted conclusion? If these criticisms of commercial activities and relations are mistaken, then the claim that the norms governing them are at odds with the norms governing intrinsic goods like parental love, sexuality, or, more generally, love and friendship, is illconceived, as is the proposal to (further) limit property rights and freedom of contract for the sake of preventing a general devaluation of intrinsic values. We may conclude, then, that any view that makes a sharp dichotomy between market norms and the norms of friendship rests on too blunt an understanding of both markets and friendships. This is not to say that there are no important differences between them. The most important difference is that, whatever the personal value of a business relationship -the enjoyment, the mutual learning, the psychological supportinsofar as it is a business relationship, it is primarily a means to the success of the business. Hence, for example, partners who continued their partnership even after it became harmful to their business, or companies that continued trading even if they gained nothing from the trade, would, in economic terms, be simply irrational (even if their actions were rational all-things-considered by virtue of other overriding reasons). Good business relationships qua business relationships must be primarily instrumental. By 32 Anderson also argues that the market is oriented to 'exit' rather than 'voice' (146). Assuming that we can make a clear distinction between the two, I see it as a virtue of markets that we can shape them largely by choosing what we buy and where we shop (exit) -an ongoing casting of "votes" with our money that allows even "economic minorities," such as diabetics or vegans, to satisfy their preferences. Most of us wouldn't want to do any more market surveys (voice), much less lobby congressmen or demonstrate on the streets (voice), to shape the market. At the same time, in some sorts of commercial establishments, such as restaurants, we do shape the offerings to some extent by conveying our preferences to our servers (voice). Thanks to Larry White for this example.
contrast, the best friendships must be primarily ends in themselves. Schwarzenbach takes this to imply that friendships belong to a higher moral plane than business relationships or, indeed, than any commercial activity.
2.4
Schwarzenbach appeals to Aristotle to distinguish between praxis as action that has its end within itself and necessarily conveys character, and poiesis as action that has its end outside itself and does not convey character (102). Friendship activities are forms of praxis motivated by "shared" concerns and "unselfish satisfaction," whereas economic activities are forms of poiesis motivated "usually" by exclusive, private, selfish concerns (103). She concludes from these premises that economic productive activities are morally inferior to the "reproductive" activities of friendship.
I have already argued that many of the alleged differences between productive activity and friendship are either nonexistent or highly exaggerated. But even if we grant all of Schwarzenbach's premises, her conclusion does not follow, as shown by the following analogy. Many scientific activities are exclusive and primarily means to the end of some human need or desire, and all scientific and artistic activities are concerned only indirectly with human relationships. But it is clearly false to think that scientific and artistic activities are inferior to relationship activities. Moreover, unless we can defend the dubious Aristotelian assumption that only the good can love each other as ends, the mere fact that a relationship is an end in itself does not guarantee its moral worth, for it might be based on a shared commitment to some evil vision. 33 Hence we must also reject the undefended (though distressingly widespread) assumption made by Schwarzenbach et al, namely, that shared activities are inherently better than unshared activities: the former may be evil and the latter deeply worthwhile.
Schwarzenbach seems to think that all rational (chosen) activities that "go toward reproducing a particular set of relationships between persons over time," such as cooking for one's family, playing with one's children, and the other activities that "women have traditionally performed in the home," are instances of "reproductive praxis" (102, 103).
But this definition of reproductive praxis turns even productive activities into praxis. For surely a woman might cook only for the sake of feeding her children and not at all for its own sake, or take a job only for the sake of supporting her children and herself and not at all because she likes it. Recognizing this, Schwarzenbach then states that many of these activities "can be performed as ends in themselves" (103, italics mine). But this implicitly acknowledges that some rational (chosen) activities that "go toward reproducing a particular set of relationships between persons over time" need not be performed as ends.
In any case, some things are much better done as means, even mere means, than as ends. A mother who potty-trained her children as an end in itself would be doing her children no favor, and one who punished them as an end would be sadistic. The insistence that doing something as an end is always better than doing it as a means amounts to "end-fetishism". Indeed, contra Schwarzenbach's (and Anderson's) claims, even when something is properly regarded as an end, it is not always morally higher or None of this is to deny that when the means to an end is not a human being or a human relationship, and the end in question is morally permissible, the end is unqualifiedly more important than the means, since the value of the means derives from the value of the end. Hence, if economic production were only a means to the ends of survival, comfort, pleasure, personal relationships etc., then it could fairly be said to be lower on the scale of value than these ends. But there is no reason to think that production is only a means to these ends (although its role as a means is hardly negligible in the absence of a regular delivery of manna from heaven). To relegate it to a lower realm of human existence, as Schwarzenbach and other critics do, is to show a serious misunderstanding of its role in a good human life. People engage in economic production for many of the same sorts of reasons that they engage in intellectual or artistic production -proving theorems, writing treatises, making music -or, indeed, building friendships: for the sake of exercising their creative or productive powers in worthwhile enterprises. Although Fromm fails to appreciate this about economic production, he appreciates better than even some defenders of free markets the meaning and importance of productiveness as such. "Productiveness," he states, "is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him" (1949: 84), and again, "[p]roductiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the `actor'; that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him" (86).
When productiveness is understood as a positive expression of human potentiality
and not simply as a means to the ends of survival, comfort, or wealth, we can appreciate the entrepreneurial and creative spirit that animates all worthwhile activities, including market activities. And then we can understand why, for instance, a philosophy Ph.D.
would find satisfaction in the enterprise of producing skateboards "adorned with uplifting
art." 34 Worthwhile activity in any sphere exercises our imaginative, emotional, and intellectual powers to create things of worth and, thereby, engages and re-shapes our identity. This is at least one reason why the failure of a business enterprise can be as devastating as the failure of a long-term scientific enterprise -or of a long-term friendship. Seeing commercial activities as "poiesis" and friendship as "praxis" distorts the nature of both business enterprises and friendships.
The fact that economic activities and relationships play an important role in a meaningful life implies that the market can no more be adequately described in morally neutral terms than can friendship: moral norms inform all worthwhile human activities.
Economic activity, as Ludwig von Mises argues, must be understood in the context of a general theory of human action. 35 In the next section I will argue that the fairness ethics he "debases something more precious" (NE, 1165b 6-13).
It might be thought that even though human beings wrong each other in all realms of life, there is still a difference between friendship and commerce, namely, that manipulation or exploitation of customers' ignorance, fear, or short-sightedness that stops short of outright fraud is regarded as fair play in commerce but not in friendship. 38 To properly consider this objection, one must first distinguish between, say, misleading ads, on the one hand, and ads that make no attempt to hide the fact that they are "dressing up" their products to make them more attractive rather than to mislead the customer (for example, despite the picture advertising the latest perfume, no one can possibly take it to claim that a woman who wears it will be mobbed by men). Such attempts are no more dishonest or exploitative than getting dressed up for a date (for example, no one can seriously believe that women have naturally bright red lips or pink finger nails). Again, it is hard to see the deception in the Shane Company's former ad, "Now you have a friend in the diamond business." For on the one hand, no one can seriously take that to mean that he has a buddy at the company he can just call up for a casual chat (although one person apparently did), 39 and on the other, anyone would be right to believe that he'll find someone friendly at the Shane Company eager to make a mutually profitable deal rather than to gyp him.
By contrast, ads that, with the clever use of emphasis and omission, make it sound (falsely) as though the advertised product is both one-of-a-kind and indispensable to your In both markets and friendship, however, these manipulations and exploitations are exceptions to the rule; neither markets nor friendship would exist if they were the rule. Misleading advertising inflicts a cost on the business by inviting skepticism; and when misleading advertising is conjoined with the widespread business policy of ensuring customer satisfaction by accepting returns, it inflicts a further cost on the business. Moreover, just as the virtues of honesty, trustworthiness, and reciprocity are partly constitutive of friendship, they are partly constitutive of market relationships.
Hence, just as to the extent that someone "debases the currency of friendship" he is deficient as a friend or, at the extreme, not a friend at all, so to the extent that a practice debases the currency of open and voluntary exchange, it is deficient as a market relationship and, at the extreme, not a market relationship at all.
The faults that exist in a free market system are the faults not of free markets, as such, but of free human beings in every sphere of action; for the most part, all that changes from one sphere to another is the form in which these faults appear. There might should an individual's overlord oust him from his station. Nor is the dignity of those in a lowly station equal to the dignity of those in an elevated station. By contrast, a dignity grounded in our nature as free and self-responsible agents, all equally free to pursue our own plans, equally free to enter or leave relationships, goes with us wherever we go, and 43 For example, Weaver, op cit, 49-50, 52.
relates us to each other as equals. But a general recognition of and respect for this dignity requires an economic and political system that enables people to realize their nature as free and self-responsible agents. Even if the beggar and the alms-giver both believe that, as a human being, the beggar is worth no less than anyone else, it is hard for either of them to genuinely feel this so long as the beggar acts like a beggar, and it is hard for the beggar to act otherwise so long as he is a beggar.
It is not surprising, then, that it is only with the increased opportunities created by market societies and the rule of law that the idea of the fundamental equality of persons qua persons -an idea praised alike by Mencius, Buddhists, Stoics, and Christiansbecame firmly established. 44 It is instructive to note that David Hume and Adam Smith celebrated the rise of commerce not only for bringing prosperity to the many, but also for promoting the rule of law, liberty, and good character. 45 Unlike the later romantics of feudalism, both Hume and Smith saw dependency as creating servility. 46 The new commercial society broke down the old feudal hierarchies of power that had kept the many dependent on the few, diffusing power by diffusing freedom and wealth and promoting the rule of law. The increased economic opportunities and security offered by the cities freed people of the need to stay in their clans or with their feudal lords for 44 A democracy without a free-market economy is not enough for equality, as shown by the fact that democracies with highly regulated economies, such as India (especially before 1991) continue to be radically unequal and radically hierarchical. 45 sustenance or protection. 47 By enabling them to strike out on their own and make their own lives, commercial society made it possible for them to earn the pride that comes from independence and self-reliance; by breaking the shackles of inherited status, the market order made it possible for people to see themselves as equals and ends in themselves.
3.4 These changes were also propitious for civic and personal friendship. In precommercial societies friends and enemies were created by custom, station, and estate -and most strangers were potential enemies (Silver, 1482-84). The universalism of the new commercial society created a public space characterized by a hitherto unknown openness and friendliness. No longer potential enemies, strangers had enough goodwill and trust to make contracts and cooperate, as well as to voluntarily help each other. It was through the equality and freedom produced by commercial society, then, that the civic friendship that Aristotle thought required a good legislator became widespread and entrenched. As Hume put it: in "the more polished….and luxurious ages" -the ages in which people "flock into cities" and "love to receive and communicate knowledge," the ages in which commerce, knowledge, and the "mechanical" and "liberal" "arts" flourish - 50 The ideal of marriage based on love rather than (ironically, for those fearful of the effects of commodification) on wealth or prestige also became widespread only with the emergence of commercial societies. 51 If in commercial societies diamonds are given as a sign of love by a hopeful bridegroom-to-be, in precommercial and noncommercial societies cows or gold are given as a price of his "love" by the hopeful parents of the bride-to-be. Indeed, end values in general gained prominence in human life only with the increased wealth and leisure of commercial societies: witness the transformation of art from a largely didactic or religious value to a largely aesthetic value, and of the wilderness from something to be tamed and used to something to be valued for itself.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that the critics of market societies misunderstand both markets and friendship by conceiving of them in radically dichotomous terms. Instrumentality, fungibility, impersonality etc. come in varying degrees and characterize not only market, but also non-market, relationships, including friendship. Further, although market relations are primarily instrumental, they are not entirely so, because the individuals involved are not mere means to ends. It is this recognition that ultimately justifies the prohibition of force and fraud that is essential to a market relationship, and free markets are the most potent social force for promoting this recognition. Moreover, like all productive or creative activities, market activities play an important role in a meaningful life and, thus, are essentially structured by moral norms. For all these reasons, far from militating against friendship, market relations often give rise to friendship, and market societies are friendlier to civic and character friendship than any other developed form of society.
